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Abstract
A fundamental principle of organizational management is that you 
measure the things that matter.  In the field of law enforcement, the most 
routinely and intensely tracked metrics often relate to reported crime 
rates.  Data-driven management systems like CompStat have a huge 
influence over law enforcement decisions about resource deployment, 
patrol assignments, performance evaluations, and promotions.  Potential 
harms of racially disparate or unnecessarily burdensome policing, on the 
other hand, are rarely analyzed as routinely or intensely.  As a result, 
evaluation of law enforcement policies and practices can often become 
a benefit-only cost-benefit analysis: Decisions about police intervention 
are made based on anticipated benefits of preventing crimes and catch-
ing offenders with little regard for the direct and indirect costs of police 
intervention to individuals and communities.
While protecting the public from crime is certainly a central goal 
of law enforcement, crime reduction alone is not a sufficient measure 
of successful public safety policy.  A law enforcement agency that con-
siders only the short-term crime control benefits of police intervention 
without adequate consideration of intangible costs to communities that 
experience the most policing risks exacerbating racial disparities in po-
lice outcomes and ultimately making communities less safe.  If promoting 
equity and minimizing unnecessary harm matter to public safety offi-
cials—as they should—officials need to measure, analyze and follow up 
on these outcomes just as they would measure, analyze and follow up on 
crime data.
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Introduction
A fundamental principle of organizational management is that you 
measure the things that matter.  If an organization wants to improve an 
outcome, it should: 1) measure and monitor that outcome; 2) set specific, 
measurable benchmarks for improvement; and 3) hold itself accountable 
to those benchmarks.  A development team may set specific benchmarks 
for how much money it intends to raise over a given period of time.  A sales 
team may set goals to hit certain revenue targets each quarter.  A human 
resources department may set goals to increase hiring, decrease employee 
turnover, or reduce rates of on the job injury.  Regardless of the goal being 
pursued, a successful organization will continuously monitor relevant met-
rics and hold itself accountable to improving them.  You can often tell a lot 
about what an institution values from the metrics that drive its work.
In the field of law enforcement, the most routinely and intensely 
tracked metrics often relate to reported crime rates.  Data-driven manage-
ment systems like CompStat have a huge influence over law enforcement 
decisions about resource deployment, patrol assignments, performance 
evaluations, and promotions.  Law enforcement agencies dedicate signifi-
cant time and financial resources to analyzing and strategizing responses 
to reported crime because they know crime reduction is a central aspect 
of their mission and a key metric by which municipal leaders and the gen-
eral public will evaluate their performance.  William Bratton, one of the 
creators of CompStat, described his approach in this way: “We began to 
run the NYPD as a private profit-oriented business.  What was the profit I 
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wanted?  Crime reduction . . . I wanted to serve my customers, the public, 
better; and the profit I wanted to deliver to them was reduced crime.”1
While protecting the public from crime is certainly a central goal 
of law enforcement, crime reduction alone is not a sufficient measure of 
successful public safety policy.  The public expects more from their law 
enforce ment officers than simply reducing crime at any cost.  We  expect 
police to obey laws and internal department policies.  We expect police to 
do their jobs fairly, impartially, and with integrity.  We expect police to value 
and respect human life, dignity, and privacy.  We expect police to avoid 
imposing burdens on the community that are not justified by important 
public safety goals.  A police department’s success cannot, therefore, be 
viewed as solely a function of falling crime rates.  When we think about 
the goals of public safety, we should consider not only whether people 
are safe from reported crime, but also whether people are safe from bur-
den and harm associated with inequitable or unnecessary police contact.2
While law enforcement agencies typically collect and analyze ex-
tensive data on when and where crimes are reported, 3 data on police 
behavior is rarely examined with the same rigor.4  We lack good national 
data regarding police stops, searches, use of force, and other interactions 
with the public.5  Factors that predict aggressive and biased policing are 
among the least studied issues in the field of policing.6  Legal scholars 
have observed that most analyses of police policies focus almost exclu-
sively on the benefits of crime deterrence and incapacitation of offenders 
1. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of 
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Po-
lice Departments William Bratton of the New York City Police Department, 41 
Law & Soc’y Rev. 147, 150 (2007).
2. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1827, 1832 (2015); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. 
L. Rev. 761, 792–94 (2012); Maria Ponomarenko & Barry Friedman, Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Public Safety: Facing the Methodological Challenges, 8 J. Bene-
fit-Cost Analysis 305 (2017).
3. Oliver Roeder et al., What Caused the Crime Decline? 65–70 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline [https:// 
perma.cc/NQJ7-6ZQG]; David Weisburd et al., The Growth of Compstat in 
American Policing 6 (2004), https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/
the-growth-of-compstat-in-american-policing [https://perma.cc/9PPN-7Y7B]; 
Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Re-
duce Crime, The Atlantic (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ national/
archive/2015/02/more-police-managed-more-effectively-really-can- reduce-
crime/385390 [https://perma.cc/KDM7-MEM4].
4. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidenced-Based Policing: Target-
ing, Testing and Tracking, 42 Crim. & Just. 377, 414 (2013) (noting that CompStat 
meetings rarely track data regarding “where . . . police [are] doing what, and for 
how much of their time on duty[.]”).
5. Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 
1119, 1139 (2013).
6. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Eng’g, and Med., Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime 
and Communities 101–103, 298–301 (2018).
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with little or no consideration of the social costs borne by heavily policed 
communities.7
In order to increase equity and reduce avoidable harm in police-cit-
izen interactions, law enforcement agencies need to start measuring 
those outcomes like they matter.  When organizations in the private 
sector prioritize equity, they keep and analyze data to identify dispar-
ities and potential solutions.  Large companies like Starbucks, Apple, 
Salesforce, Intel, and Adobe systematically track and analyze employee 
salaries, raises, and bonuses so that they can identify and address racial 
and gender disparities in pay.8  Many hospitals routinely produce equity 
reports analyzing racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in patient 
outcomes so that systemic fixes can be implemented.9  Law enforcement 
agencies need to do the same.
I. Data Analysis in Law Enforcement
A. Analyses of Data on Reported Crime
In most law enforcement agencies, analyses of crime data drive 
agency strategy and resource deployment.  Most of the largest police 
departments in the United States use some version of the CompStat 
program developed by then New York Police Department (NYPD) Com-
missioner William Bratton and his colleague Jack Maple in the 1990s.10 
CompStat is based on four primary components: maintaining timely and 
accurate information on crime in the city, developing innovative strat-
egies to address specific problems, rapidly deploying law enforcement 
resources in response to specific crime problems, and following up to 
monitor efficacy of any interventions.11  In New York, the NYPD Com-
pStat Unit generated weekly statistical reports that provided a snapshot 
of complaint and arrest activity in New York City at the precinct, patrol 
7. Ryan Fackler et al., Closing the Gap: The Need for Inclusive Benefit-cost Analy-
sis in Policing, 8 J. Benefit-Cost Analysis 330, 332 (2017).
8. Jennifer Calfas, How These Major Companies Are Getting Equal Pay Right, 
Fortune, (Apr. 9, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/04/09/equal-pay-companies- 
starbucks-apple [https://perma.cc/L4E7-JQDG].
9. E.g., Health Research and Educ. Tr., Improving Health Equity Through 
Data Collection AND Use: A Guide for Hospital Leaders (2011), http://
www.hpoe.org/Reports-HPOE/improvinghealthequity3.2011.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/S93Z-PLHS]; Robin M Weinick et al., Creating Equity Re-
ports: A Guide for Hospitals (2008), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/web- 
assets/2008/01/ creating-equity-reports [https://perma.cc/G86V-BJ7M].
10. Roeder et al., supra note 3, at 65–70; David Weisburd et al., The Growth of 
Compstat in American Policing 6 (2004), https://www.policefoundation.org/
publication/the-growth-of-compstat-in-american-policing [https://perma.cc/9P-
PN-7Y7B]; Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really 
Can Reduce Crime, The Atlantic (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2015/02/more-police-managed-more-effectively-really-can- 
reduce-crime/385390 [https://perma.cc/KDM7-MEM4].
11. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Re-
drawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63 Hastings L.J. 101, 115 (2011).
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borough, and city levels.  Electronic maps were also generated to identify 
“hot spots” where crimes clustered geographically.  Precinct commanders 
met with top department executives twice a week to discuss crime prob-
lems in their precincts and what the commanders were doing to address 
them.12  Performance evaluations and promotion decisions placed signifi-
cant weight on crime trends within each commander’s precinct.13
Despite numerous changes in department leadership, NYPD has 
continued and expanded the CompStat program for over 25 years.14  Pro-
ponents of the program credit CompStat with dramatic reductions in 
crime rates in New York City and other jurisdictions that have adopted 
the program.15  The CompStat program spread rapidly, and most law en-
forcement agencies now use some form of the program.16  Today, many 
larger police departments also use predictive policing software programs 
like PredPol and HunchLab which model the likelihood of particular 
crimes happening in a given area over a given period of time.17  Hun-
dreds of law enforcement agencies share geo-mapped data on reported 
crime with the general public through websites like crimemapping.com18 
or through special interactive online portals like the NYPD’s CompStat 
2.0.19  In short, analysis of reported crime data plays a central and contin-
ually expanding role in police decisionmaking.
B. Analyses of Data on Law Enforcement Behavior
While law enforcement agencies typically collect and analyze exten-
sive data on when and where crimes are reported, data on police behavior 
is rarely examined with the same rigor.20  The federal government and 
most states do not require police departments to collect data on stops, 
use of force, or other interactions with the public, and even departments 
12. Weisburd et al., supra note 10, at 2.
13. Id. at 15; Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas : Governance in 
the CompStat Era, 48 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 543, 547 (2014).
14. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, supra note 11, at 150; Stephanie Pagones, NYPD 
 announces new plan to combat rise in rapes, N.Y. Post, (Feb. 5, 2019), https://
nypost.com/2019/02/05/nypd-announces-new-plan-to-combat-rise-in-rapes 
[https:// perma.cc/5LXH-VS7B].
15. Roeder et al., supra note 3; Weisburd et al., supra note 10.
16. Roeder et al., supra note 3; Weisburd et al., supra note 10; Chettiar, supra note 
11.
17. Lindsey Barrett, Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the 
United States Border, 41 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 327, 335 (2017); see also Da-
vid Robinson & Logan Koepke, Stuck in a Pattern: Early Evidence on “Pre-
dictive Policing” and Civil Rights 3–4 (2016), https://www.upturn.org/static/
reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf; 
see also Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
1109, 1131–37 (2017).
18. See Frequently Asked Questions, CrimeMapping.com, https://www. crimemapping.
com/FAQ# (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
19. CompStat 2.0, NYC.gov, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/
compstat.page (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
20. Sherman, supra note 4.
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that collect these data do not necessarily analyze them to identify pat-
terns of disparate and burdensome policing.21  Law enforcement agencies 
rarely collect or analyze information about lawsuits brought against their 
officers.  Factors that predict aggressive and biased policing are among 
the least studied issues in the field of policing.22
1. Early Intervention Systems
Law enforcement analyses of officer behavior often focus on identi-
fying patterns of problematic behavior by individual officers rather than 
systemic problems within a department.  For example, an increasing num-
ber of law enforcement agencies are adopting early intervention systems 
that analyze data on police behavior to identify officers with problematic 
patterns of law enforcement behavior who may benefit from counseling 
or retraining.23  While the efficacy of early intervention systems depends 
on a number of factors, including the nature of the algorithms used, 
the accuracy of the underlying data, the adequacy of available techno-
logical infrastructure, and the quality of the interventions provided by 
frontline supervisors, there is evidence that well-run early intervention 
systems can help to reduce the frequency of citizen complaints and offi-
cer misconduct.24
Although early intervention systems are a promising tool for man-
aging unusually complaint-prone officers, they are not typically designed 
to identify or address systemic problems that involve large groups of 
officers.25  While some early intervention systems include provisions for 
analyzing patterns of problematic behavior within specific units or among 
officers who report to the same supervisor,26 these tools are primarily 
designed to address individual rather than organizational or situational 
patterns of behavior.  Different statistical tools are needed to uncover 
patterns of disparate policing arise from official policies or widespread 
practices within a law enforcement agency.
21. Joanna C. Schwartz, Systems Failures in Policing, 51 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 535, 558–
559 (2018).
22. Nat’l Acads. of Scis. Eng’g & Med., supra note 6, at 101–103, 298–301.
23. See Samuel Walker, Geoffrey P. Alpert & Dennis J. Kenney, Early Warning Sys-
tems for Police: Concept, History, and Issues, 3 Police Q. 132, 146–48 (2000).
24. Samuel Walker, et al., supra note 23, at 149; see also Stuart Macintyre, Tim Pren-
zler & Jackie Chapman, Early Intervention to Reduce Complaints: An Australian 
Victoria Police Initiative., 10 Int’l J. Police Sci. & Mgmt. 238, 241 (2008); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1029.
25. See Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: Problems With Police Traf-
fic Stop Data and an Early Warning System Solution, 3 Just. Res. & Pol’y 63, 87 
(2001).
26. Consent Decree at 17, U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769-GAF-RC 
(C.D. Cal Jun. 15, 2001), ECF No. 123, available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/
file/826956/download.
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2. Analyses of Law Enforcement Behavior and the U.S. DOJ’s 
Pattern and Practice Reform Work
Data analyses have played an important role in the police reform 
work of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Jus-
tice.  Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act gives the United 
States Department of Justice the authority to investigate and, if necessary, 
take legal action against law enforcement agencies suspected of engaging 
in a pattern and practice of violating civilians’ rights under the Constitu-
tion.  Despite limited resources to conduct investigations, the Civil Rights 
Division has found patterns and practices of unconstitutional policing in 
more than forty police departments since 1994.27  The Civil Rights Divi-
sion has frequently used statistical analyses in its investigations to identify 
patterns of racially disparate policing.28  For example, the Civil Rights Di-
vision often examines search yield rates, the rate at which searches reveal 
contraband, when investigating allegation of racial discrimination in law en-
forcement agency search practices.  If members of a particular racial group 
are, on average, less likely to be found with contraband but more likely to be 
searched, this could suggest that racial bias has influenced law enforcement 
decisions about whom to search.  The Civil Rights Division also frequently 
uses = regression analyses to control for factors that might provide alterna-
tive explanations for racial disparities in stops, searches, and use of force.29
In its reform agreements with law enforcement agencies, the Civil 
Rights Division has often required changes in procedures for collection 
and analysis of data on police stops, searches, use of force, and civilian 
complaints.30  In some cases, the Civil Rights Division has specifically re-
quired departments to engage in annual data-based assessments of police 
programs to determine whether they impose a disparate impact on the 
basis of protected characteristics, including regression analyses to control 
for potential explanatory factors other than protected characteristics.31
27. Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern 
and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–Present 3–5 (2017), https://www. 
justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [https://perma.cc/M3G7-VNX6].
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 30–32; see also Consent Decree at 45–49, U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 
No. CV 00-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal Jun. 15, 2001), ECF No. 123, available 
at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826956/download; see also Consent Decree at 
47–51, U.S. v. City Of New Orleans, No. CV 12-01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La Jul. 
24, 2012), ECF No. 2–1, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/
legacy/2012/11/07/nopd_consentdecree_7-24-12.pdf; see also Consent Decree at 
20–30, U.S. v. City of Ferguson, No. CV 16-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), 
ECF No. 12–2,  available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/833701/download; see 
also Settlement Agreement at 42–43, U.S. v. City of Seattle, No. CV 12-01282 
JLR (W.D. Wash. Jul. 27, 2012), ECF No. 3–1, available at https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Consent Decree, U.S. v. City of Ferguson, No.  4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/833701/download 
[https://perma.cc/G35K-U2PW].
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While the Civil Rights Division has done important work with re-
spect to improving analysis and collection of data on police behavior in 
some of the nation’s largest police departments, it has intervened in only 
a few dozen police departments out of more than 15,000 police and sher-
iff’s departments in the United States.32  Moreover, some departments 
have implemented new procedures and reforms pursuant to consent 
decrees with the Department of Justice only to abandon those proce-
dures after the consent decrees were lifted.33  The Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD), for example, was required under the terms of a 
2000 consent decree to collect detailed information about vehicle and 
pedestrian stops conducted by its officers and to publish semiannual re-
ports containing statistics on stops, arrests, and use of force broken down 
by race.34  After the consent decree was lifted, the LAPD stopped doc-
umenting what happened to individuals after they were stopped until 
California law changed to require collection of this information.  While 
the LAPD continued to document the race of each individual stopped, it 
stopped producing reports on the racial breakdown of stops.35
II. The Underexamined Costs of Disparate and Burdensome 
Policing
As previously discussed, law enforcement agencies frequently de-
vote significant time and resources to procuring frequent, timely, and 
detailed analyses of reported crime rates in their precincts, divisions, 
and cities.  Analyses of reported crime rates can have significant influ-
ence over an agency’s enforcement priorities, resource allocation, officer 
deployment, and employee evaluations.  Potential harms of racially dis-
parate or unnecessarily aggressive or intrusive policing, on the other 
hand, are rarely analyzed as intensely.  Evaluation of law enforcement 
policies and practices frequently amounts to a benefit-only cost-benefit 
32. See Geoffrey P. Alpert, Kyle McLean & Scott Wolfe, Consent Decrees: An Ap-
proach to Police Accountability and Reform, 20 Police Q. 239–249 (2017); Josh-
ua M. Chanin, Examining the Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Miscon-
duct Reform, 18 Police Q. 163–192 (2015).
33. Consent Decree, U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. 
Cal. Jun. 15, 2001); See also Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, “Stop-and-Frisk in a 
Car:” Elite LAPD Unit Disproportionately Stopped Black Drivers, Data Show, 
L.A. Times (Jan. 24, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ la-
me-lapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html [https://perma.cc/LL8J-3Z66]; see 
also Geoffrey P. Alpert, Kyle McLean & Scott Wolfe, Consent Decrees: An Ap-
proach to Police Accountability and Reform, 20 Police Q. 239–249 (2017); Josh-
ua M. Chanin, Examining the Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Miscon-
duct Reform, 18 Police Q. 163–192 (2015).
34. Consent Decree, U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. 
Cal. Jun. 15, 2001); See also Cindy Chang & Ben Poston, “Stop-and-Frisk in a 
Car:” Elite LAPD Unit Disproportionately Stopped Black Drivers, Data Show, 
L.A. Times (Jan. 24, 2019, 11:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-lapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html [https://perma.cc/LL8J-3Z66].
35. Id.
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analysis: decisions about police intervention are made based on antic-
ipated benefits of preventing crimes and catching offenders with little 
regard for the direct and indirect costs of police intervention to individ-
uals and communities.36
Making decisions about police intervention based on analysis of 
reported crime data without analysis of potential harms is a recipe for 
bad policy and bad policing.  While crime prevention is an important 
and central duty of law enforcement agencies, it is neither their only re-
sponsibility nor a sufficient measure of good policing.  Policing should be 
equitable and fair.  Policing should respect human life, autonomy, dignity, 
and privacy.  Policing should impose costs and harms on individuals and 
communities only when they are justified by important public interests.37
The costs of inequitable and unnecessarily aggressive or intrusive 
police contact can be significant.  Over the past five years alone, numer-
ous police shootings of unarmed civilians have prompted outrage and 
protests in communities across the United States.38  Even an investigatory 
stop and frisk, which is routine for many police officers, can represent a 
serious infringement on time and personal privacy from the perspective 
of the civilian involved.39  When members of non-White communities are 
disproportionately targeted, the dignitary and psychological harms can 
be even greater.  “Pervasive, ongoing suspicious inquiry sends the unmis-
takable message that the targets of this inquiry look like criminals: they 
are second class citizens.”40  On a community level, chronic police contact 
can have a corrosive effect on police legitimacy and community trust in 
law enforcement.  Communities that do not trust their law enforcement 
agencies may be less willing to report crimes and cooperate with law 
36. Fackler et al., supra note 7.
37. See Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 3, at 1832; Harmon, supra note 2; 
Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 New 
York Univ. Law Rev. 870, 873–40 (2015); Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Polic-
ing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 Wake Forest Law Rev. 611, 667–9 
(2016).
38. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town- 
under-siege-after-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/MEQ4-7E38] (last up-
dated Aug. 10, 2015); Mark Guarino, Protests in Chicago Continue After Of-
ficials Release Video of Police Shooting, Wash. Post (July 16, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/hundreds-protest-in-chicago-over-police- 
shooting/2018/07/16/08276a88-8960-11e8-85ae-511bc1146b0b_story.html?utm_
term=.d456299a98a6 [https://perma.cc/XS84-Z2XH]; Christina Tkacik, Remem-
bering the Baltimore Riots After Freddie Gray’s Death, 3 Years Later, Baltimore 
Sun (Apr. 27, 2018, 6:15 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-riots-three-years-later-20180426-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4BYV-VALP].
39. Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v . Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk, 15 Ohio State 
J. Crim. L. 19–33 (2017).
40. Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald P. Haider-Markel, 
Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship 5 (2014).
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enforcement investigations when they are victimized.41  Unsurprisingly, 
heavily policed communities face increased risk of adverse physical and 
mental health outcomes.42
Biased, unjust, and unnecessary police interventions can also im-
pede legitimate police efforts to control crime.  When police legitimacy 
is weak, community members may be less likely to report crimes, coop-
erate with police investigations, and follow community rules and laws.43 
Police contact with young people may, ironically, increase the likelihood 
that young people will go on to violate the law in the future.44  More-
over, every enforcement action motivated by bias, aggression, or even 
an unsupported hunch has an opportunity cost: law enforcement officers 
could have been spending that same time pursuing a lead supported by 
evidence and important public safety concerns.
Law enforcement agencies that allocate resources and set enforce-
ment strategies based solely on analyses of reported crime data without 
considering potential consequences and harms of intervention may un-
intentionally perpetuate patterns of racially disparate policing, damage 
public safety, and undermine their own efforts at crime control.  If we 
want to create a public safety system that is more equitable and less 
burdensome for traditionally marginalized communities, we need to 
adopt a more balanced perspective, paying closer attention to the social 
costs of new and existing police policies.  If law enforcement agencies 
routinely analyzed trends and disparities in stops, searches, and use of 
force, law enforcement and the communities that they serve could more 
readily identify crime interventions that cause unintended harms.  This 
information could facilitate informed cost-benefit analyses and make it 
easier for law enforcement and community stakeholders to identify po-
tential solutions.
III. Data Analysis and Police Reform
A. How Data Analyses Can Improve Police Policy
In order to promote more equitable and less burdensome policing, 
we need to start collecting and analyzing data that will shed light on the 
scope and causes of current problems so that we can hold law enforce-
ment accountable to continual improvement.
41. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 Ohio State J. Crim. Law 
231–275 (2008).
42. Susan A. Bandes et al., The Mismeasure of Terry Stops: Assessing the Psychologi-
cal and Emotional Harms of Stop and Frisk to Individuals and Communities, Be-
hav. Sci. Law (forthcoming).
43. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 41.
44. Juan Del Toro et al., When policing causes crime: The criminogenic effects 
of police stops on adolescent Black and Latino boys Legal Socialization 
(Tom R Tyler ed., 2018).
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Data analyses can help law enforcement leaders and the public 
to understand whether burdens on individual time, privacy, liberty, and 
bodily integrity imposed by law enforcement practices are proportion-
al to and justified by benefits to legitimate public safety interests.  Data 
analyses can, for example, shed light on how many innocent people are 
stopped and searched for every stop or search that leads to an arrest or 
seizure of contraband.
Data analyses can also shed light on the extent to which racial and 
other disparities in law enforcement outcomes are likely attributable 
to police policies and behavior.  Heavily policed communities in which 
police bias is an urgent concern are often also burdened with system-
ic inequities in education, health care, housing, employment, and other 
aspects of community life.  As a result, when analysis reveals that, for 
example, Black residents of a particular city are disproportionately likely 
to be stopped by police relative to their share of the population, it may 
not be immediately obvious what portion of that disparity is attribut-
able directly to law enforcement policy and behavior and what portion 
of that disparity is attributable to underlying disparities in crime rates, 
poverty, health care access, and other factors outside of police control. 
This ambiguity can lead to situations in which community members attri-
bute disparities to police bias, police attribute disparities to differences in 
crime rates, and no one can agree about what problem they are trying to 
solve, much less what should be done about it.  This type of impasse can 
be broken or avoided altogether by using regression analysis or another 
statistical approach to control for potentially confounding factors such as 
local crime rates, poverty levels, and neighborhood demographics.  Data 
analyses that control for race-neutral factors that may contribute to ob-
served racial disparities in policing outcomes can give law enforcement 
and communities a much better idea of the portion of observed dispari-
ties that law enforcement has the power to change.
Regular analysis of burden and disparities in law enforcement 
could benefit police policymaking in multiple ways.  First, insights into 
burdens and disparities in policing outcomes could help law enforcement 
agencies and community stakeholders make more informed decisions 
about whether the crime reduction benefits of particular enforcement 
strategies justify the social costs those strategies impose.
Police policymakers could also use these types of analyses to iden-
tify and regulate situations that chronically give rise to patterns of biased 
policing.  There is evidence that implementing targeted, restrictive pol-
icies can reduce harmful police behavior.45  The NYPD, for example, 
45. See, e.g., Samuel Sinyangwe, Examining the Role of Use of Force Policies in 
Ending Police Violence (2016); Samuel E Walker & Carol A Archbold, The 
New World of Police Accountability (2nd ed. 2014) at 89; Samuel Walker 
& Charles M. Katz, The Police In America: An Introduction (6th ed. 2008); 
James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An 
Empirical Examination, 7 J. Crim. Justice 309–323 (1979).
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achieved a notable reduction in police shootings in the early 1970s after 
adopting new administrative shooting guidelines that included multiple 
specific restrictions on officer discretion with respect to use of deadly 
force.  Among other restrictions, the regulations specifically prohibited 
officers from shooting at moving vehicles except when the occupants of 
the vehicle were using deadly force against the officer by means other 
than the vehicle itself.46  In the early 2000s, the U.S. Customs Service (now 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection), adopted more restrictive guide-
lines governing searches, setting specific criteria for when searches could 
be conducted and requiring prior supervisor approval for certain types 
of searches.  The number of individuals searched declined by 47 percent 
while the hit rate rose by 65 percent.  Racial disparities in search rates 
also declined.47  In 2013, a federal district court ruled in Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), that the NYPD’s use of 
stop and frisk was unconstitutional as practiced, requiring the NYPD to 
implement changes to its policies, training, auditing, performance eval-
uation procedures, and handling of civilian complaints.  Beginning in 
the latter states of the litigation and continuing through at least 2015, 
the number of stops and frisks by NYPD officers decreased dramatical-
ly.48  Racial disparities in stop and frisk outcomes for Black and Latino 
individuals diminished over the same time period.49  These examples 
are consistent with a significant body of social psychology laboratory 
research indicating that people are far more likely to engage in discrimi-
natory or aggressive behavior in situations that lack clear rules or norms 
mandating appropriate behavior.50  Reducing officer discretion in situa-
tions that chronically give rise to bad policing outcomes may therefore be 
a promising strategy for improving those outcomes.51
Perhaps most importantly, law enforcement agencies and the com-
munities that they serve can use trends in analyses of inequity and harm 
to determine whether interventions designed to improve those outcomes 
46. Fyfe, supra note 45, at 311; Police Executive Research Forum, Guiding Prin-
ciples on Use of Force 15 (2016).
47. Walker and Katz, supra note 45.
48. John MacDonald et al., Did Post–Floyd et al. Reforms Reduce Racial Disparities 
in NYPD Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices?  An Exploratory Analysis Using 
External and Internal Benchmarks, 8825 Justice Q. 1, 24 (2018).
49. Id.
50. John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary pPrejudice: The third Wave, 57 
J. Soc. Issues 829, 831 (2001); John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Contem-
porary Prejudice: From Subtle Bias to Severe Consequences, in Explaining the 
Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbors Kill 41, 44 (Victoria M Es-
ses & Richard A Vernon eds., 2008); John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological 
Model for Predicting Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. Issues 69 (1995).
51. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Predicting Bad Policing: Theorizing Burdensome and 
Racially Disparate Policing Through the Lenses of Social Psychology and Rou-
tine Activities, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. (forthcoming); Jillian K. 
 Swencioniset al., The Psychological Science of Racial Bias and Policing, 23 Psy-
chol. Pub. Pol’y L. 398, 400–02 (2017).
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have had their intended effects.  Just as follow up and ongoing evaluation 
are crucial elements of CompStat and early intervention systems, a com-
mitment to continuous monitoring and improvement is likely to be a key 
component to successful, sustainable public safety reform.
B. Addressing Challenges
Routine analysis of racial disparities and burdens in policing out-
comes may represent a significant shift for many departments.  While the 
benefits of such a shift are likely to be significant, at least two significant 
challenges may arise for many departments.  First, some police depart-
ments may not currently collect the data necessary to perform useful 
analyses.  As a result, departments may need to invest in improved data 
collection practices before they can benefit from new data analysis plans. 
Second, police departments may face challenges with analyzing data at 
a fast enough cadence to affect police policy and management decisions 
in real time.
1. Improving Data Collection
The first challenge for many departments will be improving the 
quality of their data collection.  Data analysis is only as powerful as the 
quality of the underlying data one has to work with, and law enforcement 
data is too often messy and incomplete.  Law enforcement agencies need 
to adopt data collection policies to ensure that they have the types of 
data needed to perform relevant analyses and quality assurance polices 
to identify and address odd or erratic patterns of data collection.
Ideally, law enforcement agencies should collect data on all stops, 
searches (including consent searches), and uses of force against civil-
ians, including:
• The time, date, and precise location of each encounter.
• The general reason or justification for each stop, search, or 
use of force.
• Whether the encounter was officer-initiated or in response to a 
call for service.
• The outcome of each stop or search, including whether a citation 
or arrest occurred and whether any contraband was located.
• Personal and demographic information about the civilian in-
volved, including race, gender and age.
• Personal and demographic information about the officer in-
volved, including race, gender, age, years of service, and team 
or precinct.
Combined with data on neighborhood demographics and crime 
rates, the information listed above may help police departments to begin 
to identify disparities in law enforcement outcomes and assess the extent 
to which those disparities can be attributed to law enforcement policies 
and behavior.  Of course, the more detailed a department’s records per-
taining to police-civilian contact, the more potentially useful information 
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can be obtained when analyzing the data.  It can be helpful, for example, 
to collect additional demographic information about civilians involved in 
police encounters in order to better understand whether groups such as 
people with disabilities, LGBTQ people, English language learners, and 
homeless people are at increased risk of police contact.
While norms in police data collection remain understudied, it is 
highly likely that many police departments do not currently collect all of 
the data described in the previous paragraph.  Most states do not require 
police departments to collect data on stops, use of force, or other interac-
tions with the public.52  The fact that the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice has so frequently required improved data collection 
in its reform agreements with police departments suggests that the data 
routinely collected by police departments may often be lacking.53  Some 
departments do not routinely record data on vehicle and pedestrian stops 
and searches unless they lead to an arrest or citation.  Departments that fail 
to collect such data have no way to determine whether disparities exist in 
these outcomes; they also lack any way to know how many innocent peo-
ple are stopped for every person who is cited or arrested.54
Ensuring that law enforcement agencies have sufficient data to 
analyze questions of equity and harm may require changes in industry 
norms or modifications to state, federal, and local laws.  In 2015, Cal-
ifornia passed two bills imposing new data collection requirements on 
law enforcement, AB 953 and AB 71.  AB 71 requires law enforcement 
agencies to collect and report to the California Department of Justice 
detailed information about each incident in which a civilian is killed or 
subjected to serious bodily injury by a police officer, as well as informa-
tion about each incident in which a police officer is killed or subjected to 
serious bodily injury by a civilian.55  When fully implemented, AB 953, the 
Racial and Identity Profiling Act, will require law enforcement agencies 
to collect and report to the state Attorney General detailed information 
about all vehicle and pedestrian stops, including information about the 
time, date and location of the stop; the reason for the stop; the result of 
the stop; and actions taken by the officer during the stop.56  The Racial 
52. Joanna C Schwartz, Systems Failures in Policing, 51 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 535, 558–
559 (2018).
53. Consent Decree at 42–45, U.S. v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769-GAF-RC 
(C.D. Cal. Jun. 15, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826956/download; Con-
sent Decree at 42–25, U.S. v. Cty. Of New Orleans, No. CV 12-01924-SM-JCW 
(E.D. La. Jul. 24, 2012) at 42–45, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/
legacy/2012/11/07/nopd_consentdecree_7-24-12.pdf; Consent Decree at 18, U.S. 
v. Cty. of Ferguson, No. CV 16-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/crt/file/833701/download; Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. Cty. of Seat-
tle, No. CV 12-01282 JLR (W.D. Wash. Jul. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/407201283174056123976.pdf.
54. See e.g., id.
55. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12525.2 (West 2017).
56. Cal. Gov’t Code §  12525.5 (West 2018); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, §  999.226 
(2017).
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and Identity Profiling Act required the first round of reporting from law 
enforcement agencies that employ 1,000 or more peace officers on April 
1, 2019.  All agencies will be subject to the law’s reporting requirements 
by April 1, 2023.57  Other states and municipalities may be able to learn 
practical lessons from the rollout of these new laws in California and gain 
insight into the best ways to require improved data collection and trans-
parency in their own jurisdictions.
2. Challenges with Data Analysis
Even with good data collection practices, law enforcement agen-
cies may also face challenges with analyzing certain data quickly and 
frequently enough to affect police policy and management in real time. 
While some law enforcement agencies incorporate analysis of civilian 
complaints and officer involved shootings into regular CompStat-like 
meetings,58 the numbers of such incidents are often small enough that 
they can be assessed without the need for extensive statistical analysis. 
This approach may be more challenging when assessing outcomes like 
stops and low-level uses of force that occur far more frequently than 
civilian complaints or critical incidents.  To illustrate, the NYPD Force 
Investigation Division investigated 33 civilian complaints of excessive 
force and 17 police shootings in 2018.59  The NYPD reported over 11,000 
street stops over the same time period.60  Given that police data are often 
messy and incomplete, analyzing data on routine police-civilian encoun-
ters at a regular cadence is likely to require a greater investment of time 
and resources from law enforcement agencies.
Some law enforcement agencies already have analytical units able 
to perform necessary analyses.  In some municipalities, local civilian 
oversight entities tasked with monitoring the law enforcement agency 
may be able to take on the task.  Partnerships with academic researchers 
and think tanks may provide a solution for agencies that lack internal 
resources necessary to produce timely analyses of disparities and harm 
in their policing outcomes.  For example, the Center for Policing Equity 
at John Jay College of Justice and University of California–Los Angeles 
is developing a program it refers to as “CompStat for Justice,” which will 
use statistical analysis to examine the causes of racial disparities in po-
lice stops, searches, and use of force.  The Center for Policing Equity has 
57. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12525.5, supra note 56.
58. Myles Miller, Inside the NYPD Unit That Studies Use of Police Force, Spec-
trum News NY1, (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/
news/2019/01/30/inside-the-new-nypd-unit-that-studies-use-of-police-force- 
[https://perma.cc/3HNC-BTAA]; John Annese, NYPD Poised to Create Special 
Unit to Investigate Officer-Involved Shootings, Sources Say, Staten Island Live, 
(Mar. 2015), https://www.silive.com/news/2015/03/exclusive_nypd_poised_to_
creat.html [https://perma.cc/4GGC-D9TB].
59. Miller, supra note 58.
60. N.Y.C. Police Dept., Stop, Question and Frisk Data NYPD, https://www1.nyc.
gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.page [https://perma.cc/KE7Z-CW-
CF] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
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partnered with engineers from Google to develop tools to automatically 
clean, audit, and standardize police data for analysis, substantially reduc-
ing the time it takes to produce reports for police departments.61
It should also be noted that while data on stops and use of force 
are often voluminous, so too are crime data.  Big cities like New York 
City receive—and statistically analyze—thousands of reports of major 
crime each year.62  As a field, law enforcement has committed time and 
resources to analyzing reported crime because crime reduction is an 
important part of their mission.  While it will also require a public in-
vestment of time and money to analyze data on equity and burden in law 
enforcement-community interaction on a regular basis, it is a worthwhile 
investment.  Equity, justice, and safety are worth investing in.
Conclusion
Law enforcement is and has always been a data-driven profession. 
It has, however, traditionally focused its analyses on patterns in reported 
crime.  While crime prevention is an important goal of law enforcement, it 
is not and should not be the only goal of law enforcement.  A law enforce-
ment agency that considers only the short-term crime control benefits 
of police intervention without weighing potential intangible costs to 
communities that experience the most policing risks exacerbating racial 
disparities in police outcomes and ultimately making communities less 
safe.  If promoting equity and minimizing unnecessary harm matter to 
public safety officials—as they should—officials need to measure, analyze 
and follow up on these outcomes just as they would measure, analyze and 
follow up on crime data.
61. AtlanticLive, Google.org and The Center for Policing Equity are Mapping the 
Path to Justice Through Data, Youtube (May 7, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v= J9zMT8vgEkg [perma.cc/82YB-EVWP] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
62. See N.Y.C. Police Dept., NYPD CompStat 2.0 (2019), https://compstat.nypdon-
line.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
